The source document for the concept of shock and awe is on the web. And it makes interesting reading. Especially for someone steeped in failed military theories.

The basic concept is that by overwhelming the enemy's command and control, by breaking the will of the fighters, the ground forces could just "dust up" behind the air power. The theory is full of caveats, but that is the bottom-line of the concept.

On July 1st, 1916, at 7:50AM, after days of heavy bombardment, 750,000 British troops passed into "no-man's land" at the Somme. They had been told what was believed up through the highest levels; that the massive bombardment of the previous few days had wiped the German defenders from their trenches and all that the troops would have to do was "dust-up." The half-trained troops advanced at a walk. Into murderous machine-gun fire.

58,000 British men and officers lost their lives that day.

Giulio Douhet, an Italian artilleryman, was the next false prophet. He saw a sky filled with heavy bombers and the failure of the will of a people from massive bombardment from the skies.

Ask the Germans if Dresden "broke their will." Ask Berliners of an age their opinion of "shock and awe." Or, for that matter, Londoners.

In Burma, in Normandy, on countless beaches throughout the Pacific, the same words were always used. "We're going to hit them with so much firepower their mother will bleed." And when the poor infantrymen came ashore, or up the ridge or into the valley, there was the enemy, battered, but fighting. No army has ever been bombed "into the Stone Age."

The tank destroyer, a lovely concept that was broken in its first taste of real battle, the battle cruiser, the most famous of which was the Hood which lost badly in its first fight with a real battleship, all of these have been the brainchild of some theoretician. And all of them have been shown to be failures.

By the same token, other military theories have succeeded. The most famous of these in modern times is Blitzkrieg, a method of war that was nurtured by the Germans and then matured by the American Army.

There are many differences but one of the most important seems to be "balance of force." That means that attention is paid to every part of the force with less emphasis being put on methods that boil down to "on the cheap." It is much cheaper to field bomber and fighter wings than it is to field ground combat divisions.

And if you're going to have ground combat divisions, it's cheaper to have tank-destroyers or their modern equivalent the "medium brigade" than big, heavy, nasty Abrams tanks.

And it's much much cheaper to believe that mashing through a defense and going on will work, rather than working the battle house to house to winkle out all the snipers and hold-outs. Because to do the former just needs some JDAMs, which are REALLY cheap compared to, say, forming and training another mechanized division or twain.

Before anyone breaks out the stakes, don't go blaming the Bush Administration. The concept of battle "on the cheap" much proceeds them. It permeates the current military, Armed Services Committees and provides the standard terms used in buzz word bingo. Anyone who uses the term "Reformation" in glowing tones and uses disparaging ones for "Legacy Force" should ask which would work better in An Nasyriah: M-1 Abrams that can smash through the defenses and keep the troops alive or "Stryker" combat vehicles that can't even stop a machine-gun bullet? Ask which has been more useful to this war, the F-22 Rapier that can soar to the edge of space and disappear from radar screens, or the A-10 Warthogs that turned a heavily defended ridgeline into smoking craters?

The accepted doctrine of the US Armed Forces is "Military Reformation." JDAMs are all we need for close air support and medium combat brigades can win any war. The Abrams and the Bradley are "old style," "Cold War," "outdated." Legacy. (Turn your head to the side and spit.)

Everything can be faster, cheaper, better.

Ask NASA how well that has worked.

And ask the troops of the 7th Cavalry who battled for 24 hours of horror, which they would rather have wrapped around them: A Bradley or a Stryker. Which they would rather have in the sky above them: A Rapier or a Warthog.

I know the answer. Does General Myers?

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